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ALD-212
 
        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-1381 
___________ 
 
ALVIN MOFFIT, 
   Petitioner 
v. 
 
METRO MACHINE OF PENNSYLVANIA; 
SIGNAL MUTUAL INDEMNITY ASSOCIATION, LIMITED; 
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION 
PROGRAMS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, 
   Respondents 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from a Decision and Order 
of the Benefits Review Board 
(Agency No. 11-0341) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
June 28, 2012 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER AND WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: July 3, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
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 Alvin Moffit petitions for review of a decision of the Benefits Review Board 
(“BRB”).  Because we conclude that the BRB’s decision affirming the findings of the 
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) was supported by substantial evidence and accorded 
with the law, the petition will be denied.   
 
I. 
 Petitioner filed a claim under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation 
Act (“LHWCA” or “Act”), 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950, alleging that in October, 2000, he 
sustained work-related injuries to his wrist, and, in a separate incident, to his shoulder, 
spine, and back.  He returned to work after each incident and continued his employment 
until voluntarily leaving the next month.  In a decision dated December 19, 2007, ALJ 
Ralph Romano denied Moffit’s claim for benefits, concluding both (1) that his wrist and 
shoulder conditions were not related to his employment with Metro Machine of 
Pennsylvania (“Metro Machine”) and (2) that his spine and back conditions were work-
related but did not prevent him from performing his usual employment duties until he 
resigned.   
 On appeal, the BRB vacated the ALJ’s finding that Moffit had failed to show a 
causal relationship between his wrist and shoulder conditions and his employment with 
Metro Machine.  On remand, ALJ Romano again determined that those conditions were 
not work-related but found that Moffit was entitled to medical benefits as a result of his 
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spine and back conditions.  Moffit appealed this decision to the BRB, which dismissed 
the appeal upon learning he had filed a motion for modification alleging new evidence.   
 Moffit’s case was then assigned to ALJ Janice K. Bullard, who denied Moffit’s 
claim for modification, finding he had failed to establish either a mistake in determination 
of fact in ALJ Romano’s previous decisions or a change in his condition.  Moffit 
appealed that decision to the BRB, which determined that her findings of fact and 
conclusions of law were rational, supported by substantial evidence, and in accordance 
with the law, and thus affirmed her decision in full.  The BRB subsequently denied 
Moffit’s motion for reconsideration of that decision.  Moffit now petitions for review of 
this latest decision pro se
II. 
.   
 We exercise jurisdiction over final orders of the BRB pursuant to 33 U.S.C. § 
921(c).  Our examination is limited to deciding whether the BRB acted in conformance 
with applicable law and within its proper scope of review.  Maher Terminals, Inc. v. Dir., 
Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 330 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2003).  Because the 
BRB does not administer the LHWCA, our review of its interpretation of the Act is 
essentially plenary but we will respect its interpretation provided it is reasonable.  Id.  
The BRB must accept the ALJ’s findings as long as they are not contrary to law, 
irrational, or unsupported by substantial evidence.  Barbera  v. Dir., Office of Workers’ 
Comp. Programs, 245 F.3d 282, 287 (3d Cir. 2001).  The BRB exceeds its authority if it 
makes independent factual determinations.  Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs v. 
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U.S. Steel Corp., 606 F.2d 53, 55 (3d Cir. 1979).  We will find that the BRB acted within 
the scope of its review provided its findings of fact are “supported by substantial 
evidence in the record considered as a whole.”  33 U.S.C. § 921(b)(3).  Substantial 
evidence is “less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla.”  
Jones v. Barnhart
III. 
, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).   
 Our independent review of the record finds that there is substantial evidence for 
the denial of modification.  Section 22 of the LHWCA permits modification based on 
mistake of fact in the initial decision or a change in claimant’s physical or economic 
condition.  Metro. Stevedore Co. v. Rambo, 515 U.S. 291, 301 (1995).  The ALJ has 
broad discretion under this section to correct mistakes of fact “whether demonstrated by 
wholly new evidence, cumulative evidence, or merely further reflection on the evidence 
submitted.”  O’Keeffe v. Aerojet-Gen. Shipyards, Inc., 404 U.S. 254, 256 (1971).  The 
ALJ may so correct in order to “render justice under the act,”  id. at 255, and in so doing 
may draw her or his own inferences from evidence in the record.  Del Vecchio v. Bowers
 Because there was substantial evidence in the record to deny modification, as 
discussed below, Moffit has failed to meet his burden to show that the BRB erred in 
affirming ALJ Bullard’s findings.  The affirmed findings were that petitioner failed to 
establish a mistake in fact with respect to (1) ALJ Romano’s determination that Moffit’s 
, 
296 U.S. 280, 287 (1935).     
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wrist condition is not work-related,  and (2) Moffit’s ability to work and the suitability of 
the employment Metro Machine offered, which are dispositive of his entitlement to 
disability benefits.  We now discuss each of these findings.   
 The first finding is that Moffit’s wrist condition is not work-related.  Under the 
LHWCA, there is a presumption that an employee’s claim comes within the Act’s 
provisions “in the absence of substantial evidence to the contrary.”  33 U.S.C. § 920(a).  
An employer may rebut this presumption by offering substantial evidence that the 
employee’s disability did not result from a work-related injury.  C&C Marine 
Maintenance Co. v. Bellows
 With respect to the second finding, concerning Moffit’s ability to work and the 
suitability of the employment Metro Machine offered, “disability” refers to an 
“incapacity because of injury to earn wages which the employee was receiving at the time 
of injury in the same or any other employment.”  33 U.S.C. § 902(10).  To establish a 
prima facie case of disability, a claimant must prove he is unable to perform his previous 
, 538 F.3d 293, 298 (3d Cir. 2008).  ALJ Romano determined 
that Metro Machine had established this rebuttal, and on modification ALJ Bullard found 
that Moffit did not establish a mistake in fact with respect to this finding.  ALJ Bullard 
also found that Moffit’s new evidence did not show that his post-injury wrist surgery was 
related to his work injury.  In reaching these findings, ALJ Bullard considered the 
relevant medical evidence, including the fact that Moffit’s doctor could not correlate 
Moffit’s wrist condition to his work injury.  The BRB concluded, and we agree, that these 
findings are rational and supported by substantial evidence.   
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job because of a work-related injury, and the burden then shifts to the employer to show 
other fitting jobs were on offer to him.  McCabe v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.
IV. 
, 
602 F.2d 59, 62 n.7 (3d Cir. 1979).  ALJ Romano determined, and ALJ Bullard agreed, 
that Moffit failed to establish entitlement to disability benefits:  the light-duty work 
Metro Machine offered him to indulge his complaints was within the limitations outlined 
by his doctor, and he voluntarily abandoned this suitable work by resigning for reasons 
unconnected to his work injury.  In reaching these findings, ALJ Bullard declined to 
credit Moffit’s doctor’s opinion regarding Moffit’s post-injury physical limitations 
because of the doctor’s uncertainty about the origins of Moffit’s pain.  She also found, 
however, that even if the doctor’s opinion regarding Moffit’s physical limitations were 
creditable, the light-duty work Metro Machine offered fell within the doctor’s 
restrictions.  Besides, Moffit had testified before ALJ Romano that although he had 
resigned from his employment, he was capable of light-duty work after his injury.  The 
BRB decided, and we agree, that these findings are rational and supported by substantial 
evidence.   
 Having reviewed the record as a whole, we conclude that the BRB’s decision to 
affirm the ALJ’s findings was supported by substantial evidence and accorded with the 
law.  Thus finding no substantial question, we will summarily deny the petition pursuant 
to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  Petitioner’s motion for appointment of 
counsel is denied.    
